Schueler v. Ad Art, Inc., 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 52 (Jul. 30, 2020) by Schobert, Ashley
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law 
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals 
9-2020 
Schueler v. Ad Art, Inc., 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 52 (Jul. 30, 2020) 
Ashley Schobert 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs 
This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository 
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please 
contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu. 
Schueler v. Ad Art, Inc., 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 52 (Jul. 30, 2020)1 
 
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY: A CASE-BY-CASE DETERMINATION OF WHAT 
CONSTITUTES A “PRODUCT” 
 
Summary 
 
 In Nevada, no explicit definition has been adopted to define what constitutes a product for 
purposes of strict products liability. Rather, the considerations set forth by section 402A of the 
Second Restatement of Torts must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the 
policy objectives underlying the doctrine of strict products liability are served by classifying the 
subject object as a product. Accordingly, certain classes of objects—such as large commercial 
signs or custom-made objects—are not automatically precluded from the application of strict 
products liability where the party is engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing, and 
selling such objects.  
 
Background 
 
 In 1993, MGM commissioned Ad Art, a commercial sign manufacturer, to design, 
manufacture, and install a large sign. Ad Art made the sign at its manufacturing facility in 
Stockton, California and then transported it to Las Vegas where it was installed by Ad Art and 
local construction subcontractors. Ad Art and the third-party contractors installed a 150-foot tall 
steel pylon embedded in a concrete foundation and Ad Art then mounted and installed its sign on 
top of the steel pylon. As a whole, Ad Art employees designed, engineered, and managed both the 
production and installation of the sign. 
 In 2013, MGM hired Schueler to service the pylon sign’s LED display. While Schueler 
walked along the sign’s interior platform, a panel affixed to the floor as part of the sign’s original 
design allegedly failed, causing Schueler to fall 150 feet to the ground below. Schueler suffered 
serious bodily injury as a result. 
 Schueler filed a complaint against Ad Art, alleging, among other claims, a cause of action 
sounding in strict products liability. Ad Art then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing 
that (1) it was not a successor corporation; (2) the MGM sign was not a product for purposes of 
strict liability; and (3) the statute of repose was applicable. The district court initially denied Ad 
Art’s motion and Ad Art moved for reconsideration, only setting forth the first two initial 
arguments. Upon reconsideration, the district court reversed course and granted Ad Art’s motion 
for summary judgment, concluding that the sign was not a product that is subject to the doctrine 
of strict liability. The district court did not reach the issue of successor liability. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The Court began with an analysis of the history of strict products liability, noting that courts 
initially followed the privity rule, which held that a negligent manufacturer is generally not liable 
for injuries caused by its products unless the victim is the person who actually purchased the 
product.2 However, courts in the United States departed from this approach by abolishing the 
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privity requirement in the early 20th Century.3 But because tort claims initially required plaintiffs 
to prove that a particular party in the product supply chain had failed to exercise due care,4 
plaintiffs began bringing defective products claims under contract theories instead.5 Defective 
products claims were then brought back into the realm of tort law when the California Supreme 
Court held that a manufacturer can be held strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the 
market proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.6 
 The Court then recognized that building upon this history, Dean William Prosser 
incorporated this concept in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, providing that if a 
product is defective and causes harm to a person or property, liability will be imposed on the 
manufacturer regardless of the manufacturer’s lack of fault and whether they were in privity with 
the plaintiff. 
 The Court stated that it has long recognized that the doctrine of strict products liability in 
tort is governed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A. The Court also set forth three 
policy objectives that it examines in conjunction with the considerations set forth by section 402A. 
These policy rationales include (1) promoting safety by eliminating the negligence requirement; 
(2) spreading the costs of damage from defective products to the consumer by imposing them on 
the manufacturer; and (3) removing concerns about a plaintiff’s ability to prove a remote 
manufacturer’s negligence.7 
 The Court next focused its discussion on determining whether an item or good is a product 
for the purpose of strict products liability. It noted that the Second Restatement does not provide a 
standard definition of what constitutes a product, and thus it appears that the drafters assumed that 
courts would develop the doctrine via common law by applying the policy objectives to the facts 
of the case presented. After considering supplemental briefing, the Court came to the conclusion 
that adopting a fixed definition of product is not necessary because applying the policy objectives 
articulated in section 402A is sufficient to resolve the question presented, and utilizing a case-by-
case methodology is a more prudent approach. The Court also noted that this approach is versatile 
and would thus allow the doctrine to adapt to technological advances. 
 The Court next examined the merits of the case at hand. It noted that the district court’s 
finding in favor of Ad Art turned on its interpretation of Calloway. The district court concluded 
that the Calloway court held that townhomes—and in turn, “buildings”—were not products for 
purposes of strict liability and extended that holding to apply to the MGM sign because it was a 
“building” and a one-of-a-kind object that was not mass produced. 
 The Court concluded that the district court misinterpreted and misapplied Calloway’s 
holding. The Court explained that the townhome was precluded from strict products liability in 
Calloway not because of the nature or classification of the product, but rather due to other 
circumstances. Overall, the Court found that Calloway’s holding can be explained in three parts: 
(1) parties alleging only economic loss cannot invoke the doctrine of strict product liability;8 (2) 
strict products liability claims are viable only against those who are engaged in the business of 
selling or manufacturing the defective product in question;9 and (3) the structures at issue in that 
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particular case were not products for purposes of strict liability.10 Thus, the Court found that there 
was no language in Calloway that categorically removed buildings or other similar objects, 
especially large commercial fixtures such as the MGM sign.  
 Applying the Calloway analysis to the instant case, the Court found that the MGM sign is 
a product for purposes of strict products liability and that the district court’s finding failed as a 
matter of law. To begin, the district court’s finding was predicated on the premise that, under 
Calloway, buildings are exempt from strict liability. The Court noted, however, that not only is 
this not a proper holding from Calloway, but even if it was, the holding did not permit an inference 
that the MGM sign should be considered a building. Next, the Court explained that because 
Schueler was not claiming only economic loss, but rather serious bodily injury, his claim is proper 
under strict products liability. Finally, the Court found that Ad Art was not simply a subcontractor 
or installer of component parts, but rather Ad Art built, sold, and designed the MGM sign and thus 
was liable under strict products liability.  
 The Court then found that the district court also committed legal error when it concluded 
that the MGM sign was not subject to strict products liability because it was a one-of-a-kind object 
and not mass produced. The Court explained that a product does not need to be mass-produced 
and that unique products are not automatically excluded from strict liability. Rather, the 
appropriate determination is whether the defendant was engaged in the business of designing, 
producing, and selling the objects. The Court went on to caution that accepting the proposition that 
uniquely designed objects are automatically exempt from strict products liability would largely 
insulate manufacturers, and this outcome is inconsistent with policy objectives. 
 Lastly, the Court addressed Ad Art’s arguments that subjecting it to strict products liability 
would run counter to policy objectives. The Court analyzed the three objectives set forth in 
Calloway: (1) promoting safety by eliminating the negligence requirement; (2) spreading the costs 
of damage from defective products to the consumer by imposing them on the manufacturer; and 
(3) removing concerns about a plaintiff’s ability to prove a remote manufacturer’s negligence.11 
 Ad Art first asserted that the application of strict liability would not promote safety in this 
instance because MGM was involved in every aspect of the design and the sign was not simply 
created by Ad Art. The Court concluded, however, that the facts were not consistent with this 
assertion because nothing in the record indicated that MGM was involved in the sign’s design. 
Rather, the Court found, holding Ad Art strictly liable would promote safety because Ad Art was 
in fact in the business of manufacturing and designing commercial signs, and thus assumed a duty 
toward the ultimate user who, in this case, suffered severe bodily injury from their defective 
product.  
 Ad Art then argued that because of the sign’s unique nature, it had no opportunity to spread 
costs. Ad Art cited to a case in which the defendant was not held liable under strict liability because 
it was commissioned to manufacture train cars as part of a one-time commission in which it had 
never built anything comparable.12 The Court noted that Queen City, however, is distinguishable 
from the instant case because the record indicates that Ad Art was in the business of making, 
selling, and designing commercial signs that were similar to the one in question. Accordingly, Ad 
Art had an adequate opportunity to design and develop safe products, and in turn, to spread costs.  
 Finally, Ad Art asserted that because the sign was custom-built, it was in no better position 
than MGM to know of the manufacturer’s negligence. The Court rejected this argument. It noted 
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that there is nothing in the record indicating that MGM or its employees were heavily involved in 
either the manufacturing or design of the sign. Rather, the record demonstrated that Ad Art was 
significantly involved in every step of the process. Thus, the Court was wholly unpersuaded by 
Ad Art’s arguments regarding policy objectives and instead found that holding it liable under strict 
products liability did in fact further the policy objectives of the doctrine. 
 The Court’s discussion concluded with analyzing Ad Art’s argument that the sign is more 
akin to an immovable real estate fixture and thus exempt from strict products liability. The Court 
also found this argument unpersuasive because (1) immovable fixtures are not automatically 
exempt from the doctrine of strict liability; (2) there is no evidence demonstrating that the sign is 
suddenly immovable; and (3) whether the sign is movable is not dispositive of the ultimate legal 
question. Overall, the Court noted that the Second Restatement of Torts does not limit the 
application of strict liability to personal chattels and this distinction cannot be inferred from the 
Restatement.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court held that the considerations set forth in section 402A of the Second Restatement 
of Torts must be contemplated on a case-by-case basis in order to determine whether an object is 
considered a product for purposes of strict products liability. Accordingly, a specific and limiting 
definition of product was not adopted.  
Additionally, the Court found that when objects are designed, manufactured, and sold by a 
party engaged in the business of selling and manufacturing such objects, applying strict products 
liability is appropriate. 
Finally, custom designing an object for a customer does not automatically remove an object 
from the sphere of strict liability, especially where the public policy considerations for applying 
strict products liability are satisfied.  
Because Ad Art was in the business of designing, manufacturing, and selling commercial 
signs and the policy considerations set forth by section 402A were satisfied in this case, the Court 
found it was appropriate to classify the MGM sign as a product for purposes of strict products 
liability. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Ad Art and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the Court’s holding.  
